Abstract: Using the currency demand approach, size and development of Colombia's shadow economy are estimated over the period from 1980 to 2012. The results show a great extent of shadow economic activity varying over time between 27 and 56% of GDP. The most important factors driving the shadow economy are indirect taxation and unemployment. Analyzing the interaction between shadow and official economy, the shadow economy has a negative effect on the official one. Average growth of real per capita GDP is 1.86% between 1980 and 2012, without shadow economy it would have been higher around 0.12 percentage points on average.
Introduction
Colombia is a developing country which unfortunately made the headlines in the media because of her drug crime business which negatively influenced Colombia's image by her large-scale cocaine production and trade especially in the 1980s and 90s. Our paper, however, only marginally deals with drug trafficking or other illegal (i.e., classical crime) economic activities in Colombia. The main focus of our study is the estimation of the size and the development of the shadow economy over time and its influence on the "official" economic growth of Colombia. To our knowledge these two aspects have not been investigated so far, especially the interaction of the shadow economy with the registered one and here the question whether the shadow economy has a positive or negative effect. 1 Our paper is divided into six parts. After this short introduction, in part 2 some theoretical considerations about this topic are given, explaining different ways of defining a shadow economy, analyzing the main causes that support underground activity and discussing interactions between formal (registered) and informal (shadow) economy. The following chapter, part 3, gives a brief overview of the economic structure of the country. In part 4, the econometric results of regression models based on the currency-demand approach (to calculate the size of the shadow economy in Colombia) are presented. Based on these results, in part 5 econometric estimations are shown which demonstrate the influence of the shadow economy on the official, i.e., registered one, here on "official" economic growth. In part 6, the study concludes with a summary of the main findings and a brief outlook on possible policies to tackle the problem of underground activities.
Theoretical background

Defining the shadow economy
Researchers attempting to estimate the size of unregistered economic activity face the problem of defining a shadow economy. One commonly used (working) definition is: All currently unregistered economic activities are counted that contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product.
2 Smith (1994, 18) uses the definition "market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP." One of the broadest definitions includes "those economic activities and the income derived from them that circumvent or otherwise avoid government regulation, taxation or observation." 3 As these just mentioned definitions still leave open a lot of questions, Table 1 summarizes what could be a reasonable consensus about the definition of the underground (or shadow) economy. From Table 1 , it is clear that a broad definition of the shadow economy includes unreported income from the Lippert and Walker (1997, 5) with additional own remarks.
production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions -and so includes all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to the tax authorities. 4 Our paper uses a more narrow definition of the shadow economy 5 :
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: 1. tax evasion or tax avoidance, 2. to avoid payment of social security contributions, 3. to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and/or 4. to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.
Hence, this paper does not deal with typical economic activities that are illegal and fit the characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc. 6 The definition used also excludes all non-market based economic activities like neighbour help, household and do-it-yourself work.
Theoretical considerations on the main causes for the
existence of the shadow economy
Tax and social security burdens
Numerous studies demonstrate that an increasing burden of taxes and social security contributions is one of the main causes for the development and increase of shadow economic activities. 7 The reason is that this form of fiscal intervention has a strong influence on individuals' cost-benefit and/or labour-leisure choices because it heavily increases the opportunity cost for legal economic activities and finally reduces the profitability of legal (official) work. The greater the difference between total cost of labour in the official economy and after-tax earnings from work, the greater is the incentive to work in the shadow economy.
8 Figure 1 illustrates the great importance of tax and social security contribution burdens on the size and the development of the shadow economy. 
Other causes
Other causes for the existence of the shadow economy, besides the tax and social security burdens, are the intensity of regulation, changes in labour market conditions and the employment system and changes in individual values and the 6 It has to be mentioned at this point that especially for the case of Colombia it would of course be interesting to include illegal economic activities in the calculations of the size of the shadow economy. Unfortunately, due to a lack of reliable data in this respect the authors needed to refrain from basing their estimations of the size of the shadow economy on this broader definition. 7 See Enste in Bajada and Schneider (2005) , Schneider (2005 Schneider ( , 2006 , Alm (1996) . 8 However, even major tax reforms with major tax rate deductions may not lead to a substancial decrease of the shadow economy (see results for Austria in Schneider (1994b Schneider ( , 1998b ) Such reforms may stabilize the size of the shadow economy and avoid a further increase. Social networks and personal relationships, high profits form irregular activities, and associated investments in real and human capital prevent people from going back to the official economy (for Canada, see Spiro 1993 ). 9 The great importance of tax and social security contribution burdens on the size and development of the shadow economy has also been shown in numerous empirical studies, among others by Schneider (1994b Schneider ( , 2001 Schneider ( , 2005 and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, b general attitude towards shadow economic activities. However, as it is beyond the scope of this paper, please see Schneider and Williams (2013) for a detailed description of these causes.
Theoretical reasoning about the interaction between official and inofficial economies
Obviously there are many interactions between the official (registered) and inofficial (shadow) economies in a country, hence a strict separation of these two parts of the economy is not possible. 10 Therefore it is not surprising that there is a continuous interaction between official and unofficial economy. Naylor (1996) emphasizes that the official part of the economy could never work efficiently if it were totally separated from the unofficial part. A study carried out by the OECD confirms further, that the shadow economy permanently competes with the official economy, on the other hand Lubell (1991) states that the formal and informal economies also complement each other. Other studies (Besozzi 2001; Lubell 1991 and Schneider 2005) show, that a certain influence of the shadow economy on the efficient functioning and development of the official economy cannot be denied.
In principle, these interactions stem from three main topics that are influenced by the shadow economy, namely taxation, general allocations and biased effects of economic policies. The interactions and their effects originating from these three main sources are summarized in the following table (Table 2) .
Various studies (e.g., Schneider 2005 Schneider , 2006 demonstrate the interaction between the official and the shadow economy, still, but their results are discussed controversially, especially, whether positive effects predominate negative ones or vice versa. As these effects among others always depend on the concrete size of the shadow economy, the intensity of interaction between formal and informal sector and the specific economic situation of a country, an answer can only be given after an empirical analysis is undertaken for concrete countries, which we will do for the case of Colombia. McGee (1998), Fleming, Roman, and Farrell (2000) , Schneider and Enste (2002) .
3 The economic structure of Colombia -an overview 11 For a long time, Colombia was known as one of the most important coffee exporters worldwide, but agriculture is no longer as important for the country's economy as it used to be in the 20 th century, when the economy was traditionally based on agriculture. Production and service sector are gaining importance: in 2011 these sectors contributed 23% and 54% to GDP respectively. On the one hand, this development is due to several policy reforms and stimulation programmes (initiatives to boost tourism, free trade agreements with economies worldwide, etc.), on the other hand, the improved security situation 12 (continuous peace negotiations with guerilla-groups) increased the inflows of foreign direct investment. Another part of the economy that developed rapidly in the last decade is mineral extraction 13 with a contribution to GDP of 8% in 2011 where great part of the production goes for export; in 2011, crude oil and petroleum products accounted for nearly 50% and coal for 15% of Colombia's exports.
14 Until the beginning of the 90s, the country's economic structure was characterized by a strategy of import substitution. Then, Colombia's government decided to restructure its economic position and to open, at least slightly, its boarders to allow for more international trade. At the same time a completely new constitution was enforced, leading to major changes in legislation, especially to liberalizations in the labour market and the banking sector and to an increase in social services. In 1994 the crawling peg of the Colombian peso to the US dollar was changed into a regime of floating exchange rate. To sum up, the 1990s was a decade of complete economic restructuring in Colombia which showed positive effects on the growth rate of GDP at the beginning of the decade. However, from the mid-90s on, the country suffered from stagnating growth rates and slumped into its biggest recession of the last century in 1998 which was mainly due to a heavy crisis in the banking and financial sector. This last point may also be related to a financial crisis in Brazil in the same year, as Colombia's economic performance traditionally has always been dependent on its neighbouring countries' developments, who traditionally are, apart from the US, important trading partners of the country.
11 A number of papers dealing with the economic and social situation in Colombia have recently been published in the special issue "Conflict, Crime and Violence in Colombia" of the journal "Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy" edited by Raul Caruso and Juan F. Vargas (Caruso and Vargas (eds.) 2014 ). 12 For a more detailed study about insecurity and crime in Colombia see Romero (2014) . 13 For more details about gold mining and the problems involved with it see Idrobo, Mejia, and Tribin (2014) . 14 Data source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DANE (July 2013).
Since the turn of the millenium growth of real GDP has constantly been increasing reaching 6.9% in 2007, with only one slump to 1.7% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. 15 Outlooks suggest that GDP growth will be around 4.5% in the years until 2015. 16 An important downside risk, however, is a declining external impulse triggered by the sluggish US recovery, Europe's structural crisis and the growth deceleration in China. Colombia's government is aware of the difficult economic environment and worked out a long-term programme -PIPE -to boost productivity and employment, including labour tax cuts, zero trade tariffs for a great number of products, subsidies for the industries mostly hit by the strong peso of recent years, lower energy prices, infrastructure investments, etc.
With respect to the shadow economy, Colombia's government began to actively deal with this issue already at the beginning of the 1970s. The first estimate based on a survey of Bogotá, was done in 1974 and calculated that at least 43% of the working age population in Bogotá engaged in shadow economic activities.
17 From then on, surveys have been executed regularly, mainly based on personal interviews or other microeconomic data. These investigations continuously gave high estimates of the shadow economy in the cities as well as aggregated for the whole country. The calculations lie on average between 40 and 60%.
18 Based on these results, the Colombian government lanced lots of programmes trying to integrate the "informal workforce" into the official economy. These programmes have mainly been based on basic social aids and educational trainings.
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Finally, when giving an overview of the Colombian economy, one cannot refuse to see the flourishing business of drugs and smuggling. The drug business, which has always been existent to some extent, exploded in the 1980s when the famous Colombian drug cartels came into play and began organizing a whole chain of cultivation, processing and sale of mainly cocaine. The extent of drug trafficking is estimated to have been around 7% of GDP or 70% of Colombia's exports in the early 1980s with a decreasing trend leading to estimates for the end of the 90s to around 3% of GDP or 25% of exports.
20 Recent estimations for the new millenium calculate the value of cocaine production to 1.9% of GDP in 2000 constantly decreasing to 0.4% of GDP in 2011.
21 Figure 2 shows the evolution of Misas, and Lopez (2005) . The surveys only deal with "traditional" informal activities, illegal economic activities like drug trafficking are excluded. 19 Additionally these measures can also make a contribution to the reduction of violence, see Cotte Poveda (2011) . 20 Steiner (1998) . 21 Echeverry (2013) .
the area used for coca cultivation and estimated revenues from coca cultivation in Colombia over the period 1977-2012 and 1992-2010 respectively. Somehow related to this important illegal part of Colombia's economy are the guerrillas (the main two groups are FARC and ELN) which have been quite of a problem for a long time. It cannot be denied that the guerillas contributed to general insecurity and political instability of the country. Therefore the ongoing peace negotiations with a better security situation are honoured by international investors increasing capital inflows and institutions like rating agencies which keep upgrading the country's rating leading, amongst others, to lower refinancing costs of public debt.
Empirical estimates of the size of the shadow economy in Colombia
Estimation method and variables
Different methods to estimate the size of the shadow economy have been elaborated. They can basically be divided in two groups: direct and indirect approaches. Direct, also called micro approaches use survey or interview data of a representative sample of the population to calculate the size of the shadow economy. For example the European Commission together with the United Nations Organisation and the OECD published a handbook describing a micro method of interviewing and surveying that should be quite helpful to estimate the non-observed economy in national accounts accurately and should especially contribute to make data of shadow economic activity comparable over time and countries.
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Another way of estimating the size of the shadow economy is to use macro-data of the economy (for instance national accounts, labour market data, energy input, etc.) and to calculate the size of the non-observed economy indirectly using econometric methods. One of these econometric or indirect approaches is the socalled currency demand approach. 23 We have chosen this approach for Colombia as for the application of this method the most reliable and complete dataset was available. 24 We are aware of the weaknesses of this approach (compare Appendix A, where they are discussed in detail), but we still argue that this approach is the most suitable in this case, because we have a consistent data set, the results are quite robust, and as the other only alternative, the MIMIC approach "produces" only relative results, we still would have to use another method to calibrate the values into absolute ones, most like the currency demand approach. Two variations of the currency demand model have been applied, which also have been estimated: The first uses as dependent variable, the currency demand per capita (CDC), the second uses as dependent variable the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits (CD). Using these two different specifications of the dependent variable, robustness and reliability of the estimation results can be examined. The independent variables used to explain the official currency demand are: 1. the real Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC), 2. the yearly average interest rate on deposits of 90 days (IRD), 3. the yearly average market exchange rate of the Colombian Peso to the US dollar (ER)
The variables included in the model for explaining the currency demand induced by shadow economic activities are
United Nations (2008).
23 For a detailed description and criticism on the currency-demand method see Appendix A. 24 Due to the lack of available results from personal interviews and the impossibility of doing surveys ourselves, micro approaches for estimating the size of the shadow economy could not be used. We could not apply discrepancy methods either as we had no access to the necessary data. Physical input approaches have not been considered as they did not seem a good approach to describe the Colombian shadow economy where a large part of the informal activity is trade in simple goods whose production and distribution only need marginal input of electricity. 
Based on monetary theory, the real GDP per capita and the market exchange rate are expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable in both equations, whereas the interest rate should have a negative impact. From the above theoretical considerations on the factors influencing the size and development of shadow economic activity, the coefficients of direct and indirect taxation, the unemployment rate and the proxy variables for the intensity of regulation are expected to have positive signs. To summarize, for both equations we derive for the independent variables the following signs: Table 3 shows the regression results for the two estimations based on the currency demand method. In our regressions we use yearly data for the period from 1980 to 2012. For model 1, we use the natural logarithm of currency demand 25 Another tax which certainly distorts the amount of cash is the financial transaction tax which exists in Colombia since the deep crisis of the end of the century. Botero (2013) shows, that the presence of this tax has created distortions in the demand for cash. 26 For a detailed description of the variables used see Appendix B, Table 7 . In model 1, based on the currency demand per capita, all coefficients of the independent variables show the theoretically expected signs and all of them, except the coefficient on income tax, are of high statistical significance. Model 2 replicates the outcomes of model 1 but it has to be mentioned that the results are not that clear as only the coefficients of two of the explanatory variables, GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, are statistically significant on a 5% level. Interestingly in this model, GDP per capita comes with an inexpected but significant negative coefficient, meaning that an increase in GDP per capita leads to a decrease in the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits. An explanation for this can be that over the past decades the rise in GDP per capita has gone hand in hand with an increasing importance of checking accounts compared to cash holdings. In general, we believe that the fact that a ratio always has two components that can change is the main reason why the outcomes are not that clear and significant as in model 1.
Estimation results
The variables explaining currency demand induced by shadow economic activities (direct and indirect tax rates: TY, TC and the unemployment rate: UNEMP) show the expected signs: The positive relation between rising unemployment, as well as increasing direct and indirect tax rates and the dependent variables are in line with our hypothesis that these factors support the growth of underground activities and hence have a positive impact on currency demand. Tax on consumption (TC) and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) have by far the most important quantitative influence on the dependent variable and are highly statistically significant in both equations. An increase of one percentage point in the indirect average net tax rate (TC) increases currency demand per capita by 3.8% and the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits by 2.5%, an increase of one percentage point of the unemployment rate (UNEMP) increases cash demand by 1.3% and the cash/deposits ratio by 2.2%, ceteris paribus. The direct average net tax rate (TY), also considered as an important factor to explain unregistered money demand, although it seems to have the expected positive influence on the dependent variables, does not reveal statistical significance in neither model. Moreover, the impact of the tax rate on income is much smaller than that of the tax rate on consumption. But as income taxation theoretically is one of the strongest reasons for shadow economic activity we tested the robustness of our models replacing the net effective direct tax rate by total direct tax revenues in % of GDP (TYGDP) in an alternative estimation. In this variation of our main models the coefficient on direct taxation comes up with reasonable statistical significance (see Table 4 ).
However, we decided to stick to our original models in the following reasoning and simulations as the variable "total direct tax revenues" for our purposes here is somewhat difficult to argue, since it may vary for two reasons: Firstly because of varying tax rates, secondly because tax collection becomes more or less effective (a factor we already control for by the variables EPE and LAW). Still, these alternative estimations fulfil the purpose to check that the theoretical reasoning about the importance of income taxation on hidden economy is accurate.
In our main models above, also the proxies for intensity of regulation and control by public authorities (EPE: real expenditures for public employees in % of GDP and LAW: the number of new laws issued per year) show the expected positive effect on currency demand; only in model 2, the coefficient on LAW appears with a negative but very small and statistically insignificant value. This finding is supported by our above theoretical argumentation that higher intervention in the market through stronger regulation increases the size of the shadow economy and consequently the demand for cash.
Estimation results including drug business as explanatory factor for cash demand
We are aware that economic crime, mainly drug trafficking and production, is present to a great extent in Colombia, but we generally want to stick to the narrow definition of the shadow economy (as pointed out in chapter 2.1) in this paper. Firstly, because reliable time series data describing drug business and other economic crime is hardly available. Secondly, we believe that traditional factors like higher taxation which normally lead to higher activity in the informal sector do not have this same influence on economic activity as criminal businesses like coca production. 28 However, we have experienced much criticism because of basing our research on the narrow definition of the shadow economy.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime offers data on price and productivity developments in Colombia's coca business for the period 1992-2010. Although this is a rather short time period, we run an estimation variant of our original cash demand model including the estimated total revenues from Colombian coca production (COC) as explanatory variable (regression results see Note: ***Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.05, *Significant at 0.1. Source: Own calculations. Table 5 ). It is interesting to see, that in this variant it seems that only drug business explains unregistered cash demand while all other variables included for describing shadow economic activity (taxation, unemployment, regulation) are not statistically significant in this model. A 1% increase of the revenues from coca business raises cash demand by 0.1%. This outcome is interesting, firstly because one may be surprised by this rather small effect compared to the much larger and statistically highly significant aggregated influence of traditional factors describing the hidden economy like taxation and unemployment in our original model. Secondly, the results of this last estimation may lead to the conclusion that the one and only factor describing unregistered demand for cash in Colombia in the last 2 decades was drug business. This model variant including criminal activity presented above is not satisfactory to us because the data series is too short in our point of view; possibly this short sample period leads to biased outcomes as we only have 18 observations for 8 explanatory variables. Although this model shows a positive influence of drug business on cash demand, we decided to stick to our main models based on the narrow definition of a shadow economy and specified above in chapter 4.1 in the following of this paper. However, this exercise of extending our models for criminal components shows that the numbers resulting from our simulations on the size of the shadow economy below may possibly underestimate the volume or at least give the lower band of its size.
Calculation of the size of the shadow economy
The next step is to undertake simulations, where the values of the variables used to explain the currency demand induced by shadow economic activities (TY, TC, UNEMP, EPE, LAW) are held on their lowest levels, in order to calculate the theoretical ("official") currency demand per capita. The difference between the real observed and the calculated theoretical demand for money basically gives the estimated currency demand per capita induced by shadow economic activities. These results multiplied by the velocity of money in the official economy provide value added figures of the estimated size of the shadow economy which can be shown as a percentage of GDP. However, it has to be mentioned that here two main restrictions of the monetary approach come into play which have been taken explicitely into account and corrected for in our simulations on the size of the shadow economy presented below: First, the assumption of the same velocity of money in the registered and the shadow economy is only valid when income elasticity is equal to one. If this is not the case, calculations of the size of the shadow economy have to be adjusted by a correction factor which is based on the long-run income elasticity of money. Secondly, estimations of the income elasticity of money are in general based on short-run, i.e., dynamic model specifications, to be concrete, they include the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, such short-run models have to be adjusted for calculating the long-run income elasticity of money. 29 The estimate of the implicit long-run income elasticity for Colombia gives a value of 1.8. This value has been taken to correct the estimations of the size of the shadow economy presented below. 30 Figure 3 shows the simulation results of our two main models for the size of the shadow economy in Colombia. As the results of the model variant we specified based on a broader definition of shadow economy in cap. IV.C. are not statistically significant for the most interesting variable in this case, namely coca production, we refrain from including the simulations on the size of the shadow 29 For a detailed discussion on possible corrections with respect to the restrictions mentioned see Ahumada, Alvaredo, and Canavese (2007) . 30 Without this correction the simulations would overestimate the size of the shadow economy: The average size of the shadow economy between 1980 and 2012 is 43% for the models where the adjustment has been done whereas the average without correction would be 47%. 31 We do not include the estimation results based on model variant 1 including drug business as the outcomes do not differ a lot from the ones resulting from the original model 1 (cash demand per capita). 32 Arango, Misas and López who carried out the cited study for the Colombian Central Bank estimated a MIMIC model. As simulations of the size of the shadow economy based on MIMIC models only give index numbers a second, absolute estimation for the size of the shadow economy for at least one point in time is needed to convert the indices in absolute numbers. In this case, the figures fall back on an estimate based on the currency demand method by Schneider (2002) giving a size of the Colombian shadow economy of 39% of GDP for 1999/2000.
The estimated size of the shadow economy based on model 1 gives an average of 45% of GDP during the whole period under consideration, with higher values from the mid-80s (maximum in 1987 with 56%) to the mid-90s, and showing an obviously decreasing trend from the end of the 90s on (minimum in 2008: 36%) with another slight increase during the recent world financial crisis in 2009. The estimations based on model 2 show an increasing trend from the beginning of the 80s until the end of the century, keeping the level during the first decade of the new millenium and also another slight increase during the recent crisis. The average size of the shadow economy calculated using model 2 is 42%, giving the lowest value (27%) in 1981 and the maximum (53%) in 2000. The estimates based on the variation of model 1 including revenues from coca business give slightly higher values for the size of the shadow economy in the new millennium but much lower ones at the beginning of the observation period in the mid-90s.
Comparing the development with the estimates by the Colombian Central Bank based on the MIMIC approach and considering a broader definition of the shadow economy, the most obvious deviations are the extremely strong increase at the beginning of the 80s from around 30% to 55% in only 3 years. This may be due to the organization of drug trafficants in cartels and the beginning of drug trafficking on a large scale during the 80s. This rise is reversed at the end of the 80s and the size of the shadow economy keeps decreasing until 1997, increasing then again slightly. For completeness, it has to be mentioned that only the development of the shadow economy reflects the inclusion of illegal economic activities into the MIMIC estimations. One has to be aware that the conversion of the MIMIC indices in real numbers is based on the estimates of the size of the shadow economy from the outcomes of a currency demand model based on the narrow definition of the shadow economy equal to the one taken for the estimation presented in this paper. Therefore, the relative numbers in % of GDP shown in the chart above do not include illegal economic activity neither.
The outcomes resulting from the above simulations correspond to the general expectations: One expects a generally high level of the shadow economy in Colombia given its relatively unstable economic and political situation, the low participation on the labour market, the high level of poverty among the population with mostly low or no professional qualification. The declining tendency of the size of the shadow economy shown in model 1 and the end of the rise shown by model 2 since the turn of the millenium can be attributed to some political stabilization and the beginning of the country's integration into the global market since then and the general economic expansion world-wide until 2009.
Finally, some remarks about the size and development of the Colombian shadow economy in comparison with the one of other South and Middle American countries are done; the results are presented in Appendix C, Table 8 . The sizes of the shadow economy for 21 Central and South American countries (including Colombia) are shown. The method used here is the MIMIC approach and the MIMIC estimation is shown in Schneider (2007) . 33 Table 8 , our international comparison shows, that the Colombian shadow economy is with respect to the size of the middle field, compared to the ones of other South and Middle American countries.
The interaction of the shadow economy with the official one in Colombia
The estimation of a growth model
To estimate the influence of the shadow economy on the "official" one, a growth model has to be specified, explaining the growth of real "official" GDP per capita [GGDPPC] by the independent factors influencing economic growth given using general economic theory. 33 We are thankful to an anonymous referee, who pointed out that we should make a comparison of our estimation of the size of the Colombian shadow economy with other Central and South American countries. However, we did not find studies for other South and Middle American countries using the currency demand approach. Hence, we refer to the MIMIC estimation of Schneider (2007) . Due to this, only a rough comparison between our size and development of the shadow economy within the currency demand approach can be done with other Middle and South American countries. 
According to general economic growth theory, the expected signs of the regression coefficients of the independent variables are positive for the lagged endogenous variable (GGDPPC), the exchange rate (ER), domestic and foreign direct investments (DI, FDI), total population (POP), average schooling per capita (SPC) and the participation rate on the labour market (LPA), whereas the signs of the coefficients for inflation rate (CPI) and government consumption (PCGDP) are negative. Equation (3) has been estimated using the two variations of the independent variable shadow economy: The first one uses the simulations on the size of the shadow economy calculated from the regression results of the first model (variable: currency demand per capita) and the second variation uses the estimations from model 2, based on the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits. 
Econometric results
The results are shown in Table 6 below. The estimated coefficients, in general, show the expected signs. Domestic and foreign direct investments, the exchange rate and average schooling (significant only in model 2) have a statistically highly significant positive effect on economic growth which is in line with economic growth theory. Also the coefficient on the participation rate on the labour market has the expected positive sign but without statistical significance in neither model. The price level has the expected significant negative effect on economic growth. Also governmental consumption comes up with the expected negative coefficient, but only in model 1 and without any statistic significance in neither model. The lagged endogenous variable and total population enter with the wrong sign. However, only the negative sign for the variable population is statistically significant on a high level. An explanation for the statistically significant 34 As the GDP per capita enters in the regression model for estimating the size of the shadow economy and then also appears in the model for calculating its influence on economic growth there is some risk of simultaneity. However, due to the fact that the size of the shadow economy does not directly depend on GDP but needs to be calculated through a simulation process, we do not deal with pure simultaneous equations here.
"wrong" sign for this variable could be that Colombia has been suffering from overpopulation and a growth rate which is considered too high.
For the most interesting explanatory variable in our study, the shadow economy, the regression results show a statistically highly significant, although quantitatively moderate, negative influence on GDP growth: A 1% increase in the size of the shadow economy (measured in percent of GDP), leads to a fall of the growth rate of real GDP per capita by around 0.1 percentage points, ceteris paribus. 
Simulations on the relative and absolute influence of the shadow economy on economic growth
Finally, we empirically determine the relative and absolute influence of the shadow economy for each year of our investigation; i.e., from 1980 to 2012. Apply- 35 In this point all our models, also the 2 variations including drug business, are consistent, showing a statistically highly significant negative influence of the shadow economy on real GDP growth. ing a dynamic simulation, the difference between the official and the theoretical growth of real GDP per capita (the theoretical growth rate is corrected for the influence of the shadow economy) can be calculated: Multiplying the yearly variation of the estimated size of the shadow economy with its regression coefficient provides the concrete influence of the shadow economy on GDP growth for each year in percentage points. Taking these values one can easily calculate the absolute effects of the informal economy on economic growth.
While the yearly growth rate of real GDP per capita varies between -5.41 and +5.63% or -222 and +280 USD, the relative and absolute influences on growth by shadow economic activity lie between -0.99 and +0.77 percentage points and -40 and +30 USD respectively. Which shows a moderate but still important effect of underground activity on economic growth. To sum up, for the period under consideration in total, GDP growth would have been slightly higher when correcting for unregistered activity: average published growth of real GDP p. c. was 1.86%, without influence of the shadow economy it would have been in a range between 1.96 % and 2.01 %, yearly average during 1980 and 2012.
Summary and conclusion
Applying the currency demand approach, the first major finding of our paper is the large size of the shadow economy in Colombia, over the period from 1980 to 2012. The two models give an estimation of the size of the shadow economy over the whole period under consideration of around 45% of GDP. Model 1, based on cash demand per capita, shows higher values up to more than 55% for the 80s until the mid-90s and then a decreasing trend until present. The estimations based on the second model specified based on the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits draw an increasing trend until the start of the new millennium and keeping a high level of shadow economic activity from then onwards. Both models indicate a short increase of the shadow economy during the recent financial crisis in 2009.
Our empirical analysis of the main causes for underground activities shows that taxation, especially indirect taxation, has a great effect on the growth of the shadow economy, on the other side we also find a considerable influence caused by unemployment and the intensity of regulation. Our brief investigation of the effect of business crime on cash demand was difficult because of poor data quality. However, the results are consistent in confirming the expected positive influence on cash demand.
Our second major finding is the negative effect of the shadow economy on economic growth in Colombia. Our results demonstrate a clear negative relation between the size of the shadow economy and the growth rates of real GDP per capita: The average growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1980 and 2012 is 1.86 %, without illicit activity the real economy would have grown between 1.96 % and 2.01 % on a yearly average during the period under consideration.
Considering these two major findings we draw the following two conclusions: 1. Our econometric estimates provide the clear result of a negative effect of the shadow economy on "official" economic growth. Although this influence is only moderate, it shows that there are still great latent potentials and productivities in the shadow economy which cannot be (fully) used due to the generally low productivity of the shadow economic activities and restrictions on human and financial capital resources. This may be one of the reasons why Colombia keeps being classified as a developing country and why its economic standard is still relatively low compared to western industrialized OECD nations. Colombia's government is aware about these lost potentials by not using these underground productivities and has already implemented various programmes to integrate the shadow economy in the official economy. We think it is reasonable to follow this strategy to benefit more from the shadow economic potentials. 36 2. Moreover, Colombia was one of the first countries, where the government actively began dealing with the problems and potentials of shadow economic activities. Already from the beginning of the 70s, Colombia's government has not only implemented strategies to integrate the shadow economy but also programmes were set up to aim at the reduction of shadow economic activities. Unfortunately, these programmes have not been of great success, mainly due to a lack of a long-term strategy and too little coordination of different programmes. 37 One suggestion for a better coordination of the various programmes dealing with the shadow economy could be the so-called "twopillar strategy" which is an all-embracing approach on a macroeconomic basis aiming at a slow-down or reduction in shadow economic activities.
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Previously published online March 18, 2014 (1) Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen and Strom (1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, roughly 80% of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the total shadow economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously estimated. (2) Most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause of the shadow economy. But others (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers' attitudes toward the state, tax morality and so on) are not considered, because reliable data for most countries is not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also have an impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher than reported in most studies.
41 (3) As discussed by Garcia (1978) , Park (1979) and Feige (1996) , increases in currency demand deposits are due largely to a slowdown in demand deposits rather than to an increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow economy, at least in the case of the US. (4) Blades (1982) and Feige (1986 Feige ( , 1996 criticize Tanzi's studies on the grounds that the US dollar is used as an international currency so that Tanzi should have considered (and controlled for) the presence of US dollars, which are used as an international currency and held in cash abroad.
42 Frey and Pommerehne (1984) and Thomas (1986 Thomas ( , 1992 Thomas ( , 1999 claim that Tanzi's parameter estimates are not very stable.
43 (5) Most studies assume the same velocity of money in official and shadow economies. As argued by Hill and Kabir (1996) for Canada and by Klovland (1984) for the Scandinavian countries, there is considerable uncertainty 41 One (weak) justification for the only use of the tax variable is that this variable has by far the strongest impact on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only exception is the study by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) where the variable "tax immorality" has a quantitatively larger and statistically stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model approach. In the study of Pommerehne and Schneider (1985) for the US, besides various tax measures, data for regulation, tax immorality, minimum wage rates are available, the tax variable has a dominating influence and contributes roughly 60-70% to the size of the shadow economy. See also Zilberfarb (1986) . 42 Another study by Tanzi (1982, esp. 110-113) explicitely deals with this criticism. A very careful investigation of the amount of US dollars used abroad and US currency used in the shadow economy and for "classical" crime activities has been undertaken by Rogoff (1998) , who concludes that large denomination bills are a major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy and classical crime activities, due largely to reduced transactions costs. 43 However in studies for European countries Kirchgässner (1983 Kirchgässner ( , 1984 and Schneider (1986) conclude that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust when using the currency demand method. Hill and Kabir (1996) find for Canada that the rise of the shadow economy varies with respect to the tax variable used; they conclude "when the theoretically best tax rates are selected and a range of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates underground economic growth between 1964 and 1995 at between 3% and 11% of GDP." (p. 1553). about the velocity of money in the official economy, and the velocity of money in the hidden sector is even more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of currency in the shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of an equal money velocity in both sectors. (6) Ahumada, Alvaredo, and Canavese (2006) show that the currency approach together with the assumption of equal income velocity of money in the reported and the hidden transaction is only correct if the income elasticity is 1 and suggest a correction method for that cases where the income elasticity does not equal 1. 44 (7) Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism. Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward adjustment of the size of the shadow economy. [3, 4, 11] POP Colombian total population, 1.000 Pers. 33 3.770E+04 5.574E+03 2.845E+04 4.660E+04 [5, 8] PCGDP Public spending on consumption in % of nominal GDP 
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